propose an "Egalitarian Simultaneous Reservation"rule (ESR), a generalization of Serial rule, one of the most discussed mechanisms in random assignment problem, to the more general random social choice domain. We provide an alternative de…nition, or characterization, of ESR as the unique most ordinally-egalitarian one.
Introduction
We consider the classical "voting"problem, when n agents have to jointly choose one common alternative from a given set A = fa 1 ; :::; a w g. Or goal is to investigate plausible systematic preference aggregating mechanisms (rules) for this problem, which do not use monetary transfers.
When preferences over A di¤er substantially, it might be di¢ cult to choose an alternative agents would consider a good compromise. One way to overcome this problem is to allow for an outcome to be a lottery over A, or a vector of "shares" of alternatives, rather then a unique alternative. Potentially, any probability distribution p = (p 1 ; :::; p n ) 2 A can be jointly chosen as an outcome. We may University of Glasgow, UK, and National Research University Higher School of Economics, St.Petersburg, Russia; e-mail: anna.bogomolnaia@glasgow.ac.uk.
y Support by the Basic Research Program of the National Research University Higher School of Economics is gratefully acknowledged. 1 interpret p as a real lottery to be performed. Hence, the …nal ex-post outcome still would be a single "pure" alternative. However, agents might regard the process (if not the outcome) as more fair. Alternatively, p may be interpreted as a vector of "time-shares", fractions of total time each alternative is in place. Which interpretation is more appropriate, depends on the particular economic situation. We abstract from it and concentrate on the formal model, which encompasses both.
A prominent paper by Gibbard [9] on this random social choice model restricts attention to the "ordinal" mechanisms. Agents are assumed to have strict preferences over A, and are only asked about their orderings of pure alternatives. It is implicitly assumed though, that they have cardinal utilities over the alternatives, and compare lotteries based on the expected utility. This assumption gives rise to a strong requirement of "strategy-proofness": a rule is non-manipulable only if an agent can never gain (no matter what are her cardinal utilities behind) by altering her ordinal input. Gibbard [9] characterizes all strategy-proof mechanisms. Follow-up works were also mainly concerned with non-manipulability.
When we allow for indi¤erences in agents' preferences, assignment of private goods becomes a particular case of voting model (each agent is indi¤erent between all assignments which give her the same thing). Ordinal random assignment model, with indivisible goods and no monetary transfers, became a very active area of research in recent 10-15 years. Bogomolnaia and Moulin [3] proposed to look at the ordinal random assignment mechanisms (agents are only required to report preferences over deterministic alternatives). They introduced, for the strict preference domain, a new "Serial rule", which is computed allowing agents to acquire ("eat") shares of objects simultaneously with the same constant speed, in decreasing order of their preferences. While it only satis…es a week version of non-manipulability, its fairness and e¢ ciency properties are very strong. In particular, it is not only anonymous, but also envy-free. Serial rule became one of the most studied ordinal mechanisms (another one is Random Priority). Several generalizations were proposed. Bogomolnaia, Moulin [4] introduced Egalitarian rule for the dichotomous assignment domain. Katta, Sethuraman [10] extended the de…nition of Serial rule to the full domain (in-di¤erences are allowed), which is also an extension of the above Egalitarian rule from the dichotomous domain. Several recent papers (see, for example [6] , [7] , and, for the full domain, [8] ) provided axiomatic characterizations of Serial rule, mostly by means of e¢ ciency, envy-freeness, and some type of monotonicity with respect to certain changes in preferences. Bogomolnaia [2] proposes an alternative de…nition, or a characterization, of Serial rule, both for strict and full domain. Given an arbitrary random assignment, one can calculate, for each agent i, her total probability share of goods from her k best indi¤erence classes. Serial rule happens to be the unique one which leximin maximizes the vector of all such shares (calculated for all i, k). Thus, arguably, Serial rule emerges as the (unique) most egalitarian random rule, when social planner is restricted to ordinal information only. This result also serves as a justi…cation of the extension of Serial rule to the full domain, proposed in [10] . It shows that this generalization is indeed in the same spirit as Serial (or Egalitarian) rule, aiming at the ordinally-egalitarian goal.
Returning to the random voting problem, now over full domain (indi¤erences allowed), Aziz and Stursberg [1] propose a random social choice (voting) rule which they call Egalitarian Simultaneous Reservation (ESR). This rule is based on the same "simultaneous eating" ideas as Serial rule. Indeed, ESR is introduced as a joint generalization of two rules. One is Serial rule, introduced in [3] , [4] , and [10] for strict, dichotomous, and full private goods domain, and another is Egalitarian random voting rule, de…ned in [5] on the dichotomous voting preference domain. Aziz and Stursberg [1] show that on the assignment domain ESR coincides with Serial rule and on the dichotomous domain it coincides with the Egalitarian voting rule. In order to show the equivalence with Serial rule for assignment domain, they rely on a recent characterization result, [8] , which singles out Serial rule on full domain by ordinal e¢ ciency, envy-freeness, and "limited invariance"(the proof in [8] is rather long and complicated). Aziz and Stursberg [1] check that ESR satis…es those three properties on the assignment domain. The checks, while not very complicated, are also rather long and nonintuitive. Note also, that the notion of envy-freeness looses its meaning beyond the domain of private goods'assignment. While ESR remains ordinally e¢ cient and satis…es limited invariance on the full domain, those properties do not single it out. This, while ESR is one of possible generalizations of Serial rule, the question remains whether it is the most appropriate one.
Current work proposes an alternative de…nition (or a characterization) of ESR, along the same lines as the alternative de…nition of Seral rule, proposed in Bogomolnaia [2] . It shows that, at any preference pro…le, ESR lottery is the unique leximin maximizer of the vector of the total shares agent i gets of the objects from her top k indi¤erence classes, calculated for all i and k. An immediate corollary, given the result in Bogomolnaia [2] , is an alternative, much more straightforward, way to show that ESR is indeed an extension of Serial rule to the larger domain.
Our main result can be illustrated by the following interpretation. Fix a lottery p. Split each agent in as many "sub-agents"as the number of indi¤erence classes in her preferences. Agent i's …rst sub-agent only cares about her …rst indi¤erent class, her second sub-agent only cares about her two top indi¤erent classes, etc. Thus, the utility of agent i's k-th sub-agent is measured by the total amount of objects she gets from her …rst k indi¤erence classes. Our result is that ESR rule maximizes the leximin ("Rawlsian") collective utility of those sub-agents. It …rst attempts to maximize the utility of the worst-o¤ sub-agent, then the utility of the second worst-o¤ one, and so on.
Rephrasing, the ESR allocation is the most egalitarian (the Rawlsian maximizer) in attempting to equalize agents' shares of top ranked objects (i.e. of upper counter sets of objects) under di¤erent cuto¤s. Recall that agents only report rankings of objects, not their relative valuations, so equalizing allocated shares for di¤erent upper counter sets seems to be the best available instrument for an egalitarian mechanism designer.
All the above allows us to argue that ESR is indeed "the right way" to generalize Serial rule to the general random voting domain. Both original and generalized rules have exactly the same nature: each gives the unique most "ordinally-egalitarian" way to compromise between agents.
Model and Results
Given are a set of agents N = f1; :::; ng and a set of alternatives A = fa 1 ; :::; a w g. Each agent i 2 N has arbitrary preferences R i , or i ; over A, which are represented by a partition of A into K i indi¤erence classes E 1 i ; ::: Given an arbitrary lottery p = (p 1 ; ::
For any agent i and any k K i , we de-
p j , the total share agent i gets in the lottery p of objects from her …rst k indi¤erence classes. De…ne vector t i = t p i = (t i (1); :::; t i (K i )), where K i is the number of indi¤erence classes in R i . We could think of each agent i as being represented by K i "sub-agents"with dichotomous preferences, following R i , but with di¤erent thresholds. This way, t i (k) is the total utility of the k-th "sub-agent" of agent i.
As we will see, ESR rule de…ned below aims at equalizing the utilities t i (k) of all P i2N K i sub-agents, thus maximizing their collective welfare in Rawlsian sense.
Example 1 (N = 5; A = fa; b; c; d; eg) Consider the following preference pro…le: ; 1), t 3 = ( 1 12 ; 1), t 4 = ( 3 4 ; 1), t 5 = ( 1 2 ; 11 12 ; 1). For the lottery p = ( 1 3 ; 1 3 ; 1 3 ; 0; 0), we obtain:
Aziz and Stursberg [1] propose a random social choice rule which they call Egalitarian Simultaneous Reservation (ESR).
ESR starts from the set of all feasible lotteries, and then repeatedly shrinks this set over time interval [0; 1]. This is done by sequentially introducing (the largest feasible) lower bounds on probabilities of certain indi¤erence classes from E in the …nal lottery. At each step, ESR only cares to guarantee each agent the largest share of objects from her top indi¤erence class still available for distributing. As we will see, ESR pursues an egalitarian goal to guarantee the best treatment for the worst o¤ agents. Aziz and Stursberg's de…nition is given by the following algorithm.
Each indi¤erence class E = E r i is represented by a "tower" growing over time, with the "ceiling" l t (E) 2 R + at time t. This ceiling represents the minimal guarantee for the probability the subset E of alternatives is to receive in the …nal lottery. During the course of the algorithm, agents climb up those towers (all with the same constant speed) and in doing that push up the ceilings, therefore increasing the lower bounds on probabilities of corresponding subsets.
All towers have ceilings zero at time = 0. Algorithm proceeds in stages. In stage 1, each agent starts by climbing the tower corresponding to her top indi¤erence class. A tower's height is frozen, if increasing it would result in nonexistence of a lottery satisfying all lower bounds for all towers. Once a tower is frozen, any agent at its ceiling falls o¤ it, and moves to the bottom of the tower corresponding to her next indi¤erence class 2 . Any agent in the middle of a frozen tower will continue to climb it until the frozen ceiling. Then she will fall o¤ and move to her next best tower. A stage ends whenever some agent falls o¤ some ceiling.
Notation Stage k. Compute (k) and N (k) (see the linear program below the algorithm's description), as well as towers to be frozen. Let (k+1) = (k) + (k) , and agents'heights for the beginning of the next stage be h
(new ceilings, de…ned as maximum of the old ceiling and maximal of agents'heights over those who were climbing this tower during stage k). For all agents who fell o¤, i 2 N (k) , de…ne E (k+1) (i) to be the agent's i next indi¤erence class. For remaining agents, de…ne
Calculation of (k) and N (k) comes from solving the following Linear Program.
First, we …nd (k) by solving max subject to: 2 It might be an already frozen tower! Then, for all i 2 N we run this program again, imposing = (k) , and maximizing the slack in the inequality P
function value is zero, we add corresponding i to N (k) . Thus, resulting N (k) is the largest (by inclusion) set of agents who create the "bottleneck" (prevent increasing (k) ). I.e., (k) and N (k) are computed as the largest ones so that there still exists a lottery p 2 (A) with p(S) = P a2S p(a) l (k+1) (S) for all S 2 E. Freeze (forever) ceilings of all towers which were climbed by at least one agent from N (k) .
Algorithm …nishes when all towers are frozen. Once it is …nished, ESR at the pro…le R is the set of "remaining" lotteries p; satisfying inequalities P a2S p(a) l (k) (S) for the last step k (and hence for all steps). It is straightforward to show (see [1] ) that for any pro…le R this set is essentially single-valued. Hence, ESR is indeed a random social choice rule. Moreover, it is easy to see that for any pro…le R, p 2 ESR(R) and (q utility equivalent to p) imply q 2 ESR(R). Thus, ESR(R) includes all lotteries utility equivalent to any one obtained by the algorithm above.
Example (continuation) We consider the following preference pro…le: 1 : fag 1 fbg 1 feg 1 fc; dg; 2 : fag 2 fcg 2 fdg 2 fb; eg; 3 : fb; dg 3 fa; c; eg; 4 : fc; eg 4 fa; b; dg; 5 : fcg 5 fa; b; eg 5 fdg. First, agents 1, 2 climb tower fag, agent 3 climbs tower fb; dg, agent 4 climbs tower fc; eg, and agent 5 climbs tower fcg. At time 1 3 ; the …rst bottleneck is reached, all agents fall from their respective ceilings, and move to their 2-nd best indi¤erence classes. All the above towers are frozen at the height 1 3 . At this time, the lower bounds on di¤erent subsets of alternatives (the current ceilings of corresponding towers) are l (1) (fag) = l (1) (fcg) = l (1) (fb; dg) = l (1) (fc; eg) = 1 3 . At time 2 3 ; the second bottleneck is reached, and the new lower bounds are l (2) (fbg) = l (2) (fa; c; eg) = l (2) (fa; b; dg) = l (2) (fa; b; eg) = 1 3 . Note that during this stage agent 2 is climbing the existing length of tower fcg (from the bottom till its frozen ceiling 1 3 ), so she does not push up any ceiling. Those bounds already uniquely de…ne the ESR lottery to be p = ( 1 3 ; 1 3 ; 1 3 ; 0; 0).
De…nition The leximin order L on R q is de…ned as follows. For any x = (x 1 ; :::; x q ) 2 R q , let x = (x 1 ; :::; x q ) 2 R q be a permutation of the coordinates of vector x in the increasing order: x 1 ::: x q . We say that x L y if there is a j 2 f1; :::; qg such that x j > y j , while x i = y i for all i < j.
For the lottery q = ( 1 6 ; 0; 
Theorem 1
For all preference pro…les R, ESR(R) is exactly the set of lotteries over (A) which leximin maximize the vector 3 of shares t = (t 1 ; :::; t n ).
Note The intuition behind this result is based on the following. An agent never "skips" a tower corresponding to some of her indi¤erence class (even if it is already frozen), and climbs each subsequent tower up to its ceiling. Thus, by time , the ESR algorithm guarantees to any agent the combined probability share of the upper counter set of the tower she is currently climbing. The time when an agent falls from a tower S is exactly the share she (and her corresponding sub-agent) gets of the upper counter of S. Each time we reach a bottleneck is exactly the moment where we cannot increase shares of all "nonfrozen" 4 sub-agents anymore, and are forced to "freeze" shares of the set N (k) of the worst o¤ not yet "frozen" sub-agents.
Proof.
Fix an arbitrary preference pro…le R. Since they are utility equivalent, all p 2 ESR(R) result in the the same vector t p and same permutation-vector t p . Denote the corresponding permutation : t p ! t p .
Since k < r implies t p i (k) t p i (r), we can assume that is such that (t p i (k)) < (t p i (r)) for any i, whenever k < r. In the algorithm, each agent i climbs towers corresponding to her indi¤erence classes E 1 i ; :::; E Ki i successively in increasing order, and without skipping. She only falls o¤ a tower and moves to the next one once she reaches a frozen ceiling. Assume at the end of stage k, at the time (k+1) , agent i falls o¤ tower E m i . It means that by the time (k+1) towers corresponding to E 1 i ; :::; E m i are frozen at their "…nal" heights l E 1 i ; :::; l (E m i ) which correspond to their maximal feasible minimal guarantees. I.e., in a …nal lottery probabilities of those indi¤erence classes will be exactly l E 1 i ; :::; l (E m i ). Since our agent i goes through each tower from bottom to top and never stops, we obtain that the total share she gets of objects from her …rst m indi¤erence classes t p i (m) = l E 1 i + ::: + l (E m i ) = (k+1) . 3 Recall that each t i is itself a vector, t i = (t i (1); ::
Hence, t = (t 1 ; :::; tn) is the vector of length P i2N K i .
Moreover, if instead at the beginning of stage k + 1 agent i is at the height h
We will check by induction (in stages of the algorithm), that at each stage k the algorithm to …nd ESR(R) considers, for each agent i, the smallest "not yet …xed" t p i (m i ) (here m i = m i (k), we suppress the stage index), and maximizes ("…xes") the smallest of those. More speci…cally, it …nds a largest such that it is feasible to have min i2N t p i (m i ) and "…xes"all t p i (m i ) which cannot be larger than to be t p i (m i ) = . The theorem follows immediately from this statement. In stage 0, the algorithm starts by eliminating all lotteries, except those which maximize the smallest among t p i (1) = p(E 1 i ) = P a2E 1 i p(a), i.e. the smallest element in t p . In other words, it "…xes"(freezes) all t p i (1) with i 2 N (k) , i.e. all t p i (1) which cannot feasibly be more then (1) , at the level t p i (1) = (1) . In each next stage k + 1, the algorithm pays attention to exactly one tower E mi i for each agent i (the tower E (k+1) (i) she climbs during this stage), corresponding to her m i -th indi¤erence class (m i = m i (k + 1), we suppress the stage index), while all towers corresponding to agents'better indi¤erence classes are already frozen. Hence, all t p i (m) for all i and all m < m i , are "…xed" to t p i (m) = l E 1 i + ::: + l (E m i ), their best minimal guarantees (by induction hypothesis).
In stage k + 1 we …nd the largest such that p (E mi i ) = p E (k+1) (i) = P 
t p i (m i 1) + , or the t p i (m i ) = p (E mi i ) + t p i (m i 1) (k+1) + . Thus, algorithm …nds the largest amount (k+2) = (k+1) + (k+1) such that all t p i (m i ) are at least (k+2) . It then freezes all towers E mi i = E (k+1) (i) whose height cannot feasibly increase, i.e., "…xes" all t p i (m i ) which cannot be larger then (k+2) to be t p i (m i ) = (k+2) .
The same line of argument allows us to prove a parallel characterization. Let t 0 i (a) to be the total share of objects at least as good as a agent i gets. The vector t 0 = (t 0 i (a)) i;a has …xed length nw, no matter whether preferences are strict or not.
Theorem 1a
For all preference pro…les R, ESR(R) is also exactly the set of leximin maximizers of the t = (t 0 i (a)) i;a . Serial rule for random assignment problem is known to be characterized by the same property as in our Theorem 1 (see [2] ). We hence obtain:
Corollary
On the assignment domain, ESR coincides with Serial rule.
